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COMMENT 
EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES AS SUBSTANTIVE 
PROOF OF GUILT IN MARYLAND 
"The cases dealing with admissibility of prior criminal acts 
are narrowly decided. Indeed, the results often appear 
contradictory . ... "1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In a Maryland criminal trial, the prosecution may not introduce 
evidence of other crimes committed by a defendant in order to 
demonstrate a probability of guilt of the crime alleged. 2 The 
Maryland courts have consistently held that the past criminal 
history of an individual does not inexorably compel a conclusion of 
current criminal conduct or, more importantly, guilt of a particular 
crime.3 This general rule of exclusion of other crimes committed by 
the defendant is founded upon the principle that no one should suffer 
a criminal conviction solely because of a bad character.4 
It is well settled that in a criminal trial the burden is upon the 
state to prove that the defendant actually committed the crime 
alleged. The trier of fact may not infer that the defendant is guilty 
merely because of a possible criminal disposition evidenced by prior 
convictions. Indeed, Maryland decisions relying on the general rule 
of inadmissibility often note that the court is invoking the rule in an 
attempt to avoid situations in which a defendant is convicted solely 
1. Hoes v. State, 35 Md. App. 61, 67, 368 A.2d 1080, 1084 (1977l. 
2. The application of the rule is illustrated in State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232, 395 
A.2d 1182 (1979), in which the court held that in a prosecution for homicide 
perpetrated in the commission of a robbery a prosecutor would not be able to 
introduce evidence of other robberies committed by the defendant. 
3. The Maryland cases which enunciate this general rule are abundant. See, e.g., 
Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664,669,350 A.2d 680, 684 (1976> (citing cases); Hoes v. 
State, 35 Md. App. 61, 368 A.2d 1080 (1977); Setzer v. State, 29 Md. App. 347, 
348 A.2d 866 (1975l. 
4. Frequently those cases which state the general rule of exclusion note that it 
merely implements the policy against bad character evidence. E.g., Ross v. 
State, 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680 (1976). The Ross opinion states: 
The frequently enunciated general rule in this state, followed uniformly 
elsewhere, is that in a prosecution for a particular crime, evidence 
which in any manner shows or tends to show that the accused has 
committed another crime wholly independent of that for which he is on 
trial, even though it be a crime of the same type, is irrelevant and 
inadmissible. . . . This principle is merely an application of the policy 
rule prohibiting the initial introduction by the prosecution of evidence 
of bad character. 
Id. at 669, 350 A.2d at 684. 
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because the prosecutor has demonstrated that the accused is a "bad 
person" with anti-social propensities.5 
Nonetheless, proof of other crimes may be legitimately relevant 
to some cases beyond the mere showing of criminal propensity. The 
state may wish to show that the specific crime with which the 
accused is charged is but one of a series designed to accomplish a 
single criminal objective. Similarly, the state's attorney prosecuting 
a defendant for shooting his wife could refute a defense of accident by 
demonstrating that the accused had made similar attempts in the 
past. Such considerations have led to the development of well 
established exceptions to the general rule of exclusion.6 Traditionally 
in Maryland, evidence of other crimes is admissible when it 
demonstrates motive,7 intent,S absence of mistake,9 identity,1O or a 
5. E.g., Dobson v. State, 24 Md. App. 644, 335 A.2d 124 (1975); Babb v. State, 7 
Md. App. 116, 253 A.2d 783, rev'd on other grounds, 258 Md. 547, 267 A.2d 190 
(1969); Gilchrist v. State, 2 Md. App. 635, 236 A.2d 299 (1967l. 
6. These exceptions to the general rule of exclusion are commonly referred to as 
the "MIMIC" exception. "MIMIC" is mnemonic which enables one to recall 
motive, intent, absence of mistake, identity, and common scheme. 
7. E.g., Veney v. State, 251 Md. 182,246 A.2d 568 (968) <Defendant attempting to 
avoid arrest for armed robbery killed police officer attempting to arrest him; 
evidence of the robbery held properly admitted.>, cert. denied, 394 U.S. 948 
(1969); Brown v. State, 220 Md. 29, 150 A.2d 895 (959) <Defendant who feared 
prosecution for his numerous utterings of forged checks, killed police officer 
arresting him for one uttering offense; evidence of the other check offenses held 
properly admitted.>. 
8. E.g., Wilson v. State, 181 Md. 1, 26 A.2d 770 (1942) (Woman who procured 
illegal abortion from defendant doctor testified in a way that the jury could 
have inferred that she had obtained another illegal abortion from the defendant 
the previous year; evidence of the former transaction admissible as showing an 
intent to perform unlawful abortions.>; Isaacs v. State, 31 Md. App. 604. 358 
A.2d 273 (1976> nn defendant's trial for murder, kidnapping, and larceny, 
female companion of defendant permitted to testify about prior crime spree 
involving numerous thefts; evidence of the former crime spree admissible 
apparently as demonstrative of the requisite intent for larceny.!. 
9. E.g., Hoes v. State, 35 Md. App. 61, 368 A.2d 1080 (1977) {Defendant who shot 
his live-in girlfriend claimed that his shotgun had accidentally discharged; 
evidence that the defendant had shot the same victim five years earlier 
admissible.); Nelson v. State, 5 Md. App. 109, 245 A.2d 606 (1968) (In a 
prosecution for murder, evidence that defendant and his companions had 
exchanged racial insults with the victim and his companions held admissible on 
the grounds that the first incident demonstrated that participation in the 
second was not a mistake.), 
No Maryland case, however, places an exclusive reliance upon the absence 
of mistake exception in admitting evidence of other crimes. In this context. see 
text accompanying notes 57 & 58 infra. Both Hoes and Nelson illustrate this 
assertion. In Hoes the evidence was ultimately admitted under the intent 
exception, and the Nelson court thought that five different exceptions applied to 
the situation before it. Indeed, in Hoes. despite the ultimate reliance placed on 
the intent exception, at the outS'et of the opinion the court of special appeals 
formulated the issue to be decided in a somewhat bizarre fashion. stating: "The 
primary question to be answered here is whether the shooting of a 'common 
law' wife by a one-armed man twice within five years could constitute a 'plan or 
scheme' to maim her." 35 Md. App. at 62. 368 A.2d at 1081. 
10. E.g .. Cross v. State. 282 Md. 468. 386 A.2d 757 119781 lin a burglary 
prosecution. the state attempted to identify the defendant through his vehicle 
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common scheme. II Additionally, Maryland courts recognize three 
other exceptions that are often overlooked: 12 res gestae,t3 handiwork 
or signature,14 and sex crimes. 15 
registration tag number which was allegedly obtained as the defendant fled the 
scene of another burglary he supposedly committed an hour later; evidence 
inadmissible because defendant's participation in the second burglary not 
clearly established.); Mollar v. State, 25 Md. App. 291, 333 A.2d 625 (1975) 
<Defendant related his past criminal record to his rape victim; record of his past 
crimes admissible to identify defendant.>. 
11. E.g., Avery v. State, 15 Md. App. 520, 292 A.2d 728 (1972) (In a prosecution for 
assault and attempted rape in which the defendant, a doctor, gave the victim an 
injection to render her unconscious before molesting her, evidence that he had 
earlier perpetrated the same crime against the same victim in the same fashion 
held admissible as constituting a common scheme of sexual gratification.), cert. 
denied, 410 U.S. 977 (1973); Douglas v. State, 9 Md. App. 647, 267 A.2d 291 
(1970) (In a robbery prosecution, testimony that the defendant contempor-
aneously robbed the victim's supervisor admissible as constituting a common 
scheme.). 
One could argue that both Avery and Douglas reached the right result for 
the wrong reason. Specifically, it would appear that in Avery the court should 
have relied upon the handiwork/signature or sex crimes exceptions, discussed 
infra at text accompanying notes 82-92 and 59-63 respectively, in admitting 
the evidence of the other crimes. Similarly, the Douglas court could better have 
relied upon the res gestae exception, discussed in text accompanying notes 
102-08 infra, in admitting the evidence of the contemporaneous robbery. In 
any event, the Douglas decision as to the admissibility of the other robbery 
constituted dictum because defense counsel had failed to preserve the point for 
appeal. Id. at 651, 267 A.2d at 293. 
The confusion exhibited in the Avery and Douglas decisions typifies the 
ordinary judicial approach in Maryland to the admissibility of other crimes. In 
essence, courts frequently confuse the exceptions with each other, a phenome-
non which inures to the benefit of neither the state nor the defendant. For a 
detailed discussion of the problem, and a possible solution, see text accompany-
ing notes 135-58 infra. 
12. The three additional exceptions are probably forgotten because the courts 
frequently emphasize the exceptions that comprise the "MIMIC" mnemonic, 
discussed at note 6 supra. In this light, consider the quotation attributed to an 
assistant state's attorney in Martin v. State, 40 Md. App. 248, 389 A.2d 1374 
(1978). The case reports a colloquy between the court and the prosecutor who 
said: "That there is an abundance of case law in the State of Maryland and in 
the legal treatises that indicate [sic) that evidence of another crime is 
admissible. If it falls within one of the five exceptions to the general rule, such 
evidence is then admissible." [d. at 250, 398 A.2d at 1375 (emphasis added). 
13. E.g., Tull v. State, 230 Md. 596, 188 A.2d 150 (1963) <During a domestic 
disturbance, the defendant first shot his father-in-law and then his wife; the 
evidence as to the father-in-law was admissible in the trill I for the murder of 
the wife under the res gestae exception.>. 
14. E.g., McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 375 A.2d 551 (1977) (In a trial for robbery 
accomplished by yoking the victim, that is, grabbing him from behind and 
choking him with one hand while rifling his pockets with the other, evidence 
that the defendant had committed other yokings not admissible under the 
handiwork exception because the modus operandi used by the defendant was 
not sufficiently distinctive.>; Ellerba v. State, 41 Md. App. 712, 398 A.2d 1250 
(1979) (In a trial for arson, testimony as to another arson committed by the 
defendant inadmissible under the handiwork exception because the defendant 
allegedly used two different methods to set the fires.l. 
15. E.g., Wentz v. State, 159 Md. 161, 150 A. 278 (1930) (In an incest prosecution. 
the trial court admitted evidence that the defendant had had intercourse with 
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Commentators often remark that the numerous exceptions 
threaten to swallow the general rule of exclusion. IS This situation 
creates confusion as to the admissibility of other crimes in specific 
instances, and causes reversals that could have been avoided if 
prosecutors and trial courts had clearer guidelines to followY The 
practicing attorney's problem is compounded in that most older 
opinions merely refer to some or all of the exceptions mentioned 
above without applying them to the facts. IS Recent Maryland 
decisions, however, do not analyze the other crimes situations solely 
in terms of the general rule and its exceptions. Instead, these later 
decisions employ a two-step process. The courts first determine 
whether the evidence fits into one or more of the exceptions, and 
second balance the prejudicial effect of that evidence against its 
probative value. 19 Through this process the defendant obtains greater 
guarantees of fairness. 2o 
As a result of the numerous exceptions to the rule of exclusion, 
and the varied approaches to its application, the process of determin-
ing whether a specific factual situation authorizes the use of other 
crimes evidence has become increasingly difficult. This comment 
examines the exceptions to the general exclusionary rule,21 and 
explores the inadequacies of the Maryland approach. Finally, an 
elementary change with regard to the admissibility of other crimes 
evidence is recommended in an attempt to eliminate the current 
state of confusion. 
another of his daughters; evidence was improperly admitted because the 
testimony did not concern the same victim as the subject of the prosecution.). 
16. E.g., Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 854 (1955); Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 817 (1955); Annot., 15 
A.L.R.2d 1080 (1951). All of these annotations contain this general assertion. 
17. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232,395 A.2d 1182 (1979) (string of successive 
robberies held not to demonstrate a common scheme because all resulted from 
separate decisions to rob someone). 
18. E.g., Pinkett v. State, 30 Md. App. 458, 352 A.2d 358 (1976); Polisher v. State, 
11 Md. App. 555, 276 A.2d 102, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); Dyson v. 
State, 6 Md. App. 453, 251 A.2d 606 (969), 
This failure to perform any factual analysis has been criticized by the court 
of appeals as being particularly unhelpful. Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 670, 350 
A.2d 680, 685 (1976), 
19. E.g., Worthen v. State, 42 Md. App. 20,399 A.2d 272 (1979) (While no existing 
exception was specifically discussed, trial court's admission of a purported prior 
offense was inadmissible because of its highly prejudicial and inflammatory 
effect.>. 
20. See notes 113-25 and accompanying text infra. 
21. This comment does not purport to examine or analyze the Maryland law 
pertaining to issues of entrapment or impeachment which also involve the 
admissibility of other crimes evidence. 
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A. Exceptions Dealing with Mental State: Motive, Intent, Absence of 
Mistake, and Sex Crimes 
The motive exception to the general rule of exclusion, which the 
cases usually discuss first, provides that if another crime illustrates 
the motive behind the crime with which the defendant is charged, 
the court should admit the commission of the other crime into 
evidence. This is illustrated by Brown v. State. 22 In Brown, the 
defendant killed a police officer who was arresting him for uttering a 
worthless check. The Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld the trial 
court's admission of evidence that the defendant had uttered other 
worthless checks on the basis that the homicide was actuated by 
Brown's desire to escape prosecution for his prior criminal activity.23 
Some Maryland courts that rely on· the motive exception to 
admit evidence of other crimes effectively add another level to their 
analyses. In Roberts v. State,24 the court of appeals affirmed an 
assault and battery conviction in which the trial court had admitted 
evidence of a prior theft involving the same defendant and victim. 
Testimony elicited at trial demonstrated that the defendant had 
received a jail sentence for the previous crime of larceny as a result 
of the victim's account of the incident. That testimony precipitated a 
motive of revenge, which caused the defendant to assault the victim. 
Thus in Roberts, the court broadened the motive exception to include 
not only the other crimes evidence, but its attendant circumstances 
as well. 
Additionally, other cases admitting or excluding evidence of 
other crimes do so on the basis of more general motives such as 
hatred,25 or broadly based criminal activity such as narcotics 
involvement. 26 This has resulted in a myriad of situations to which 
22. 220 Md. 29, 150 A.2d 895 <1959l. 
23. Id. at 37, 150 A.2d at 899. See also Veney v. State, 251 Md. 182, 246 A.2d 568 
(1968) (Police sergeant was shot and killed on Christmas Day by an individual 
whom the sergeant attempted to arrest for a hold-up; evidence of the hold-up 
admissible at the trial of defendant for the sergeant's murder.), cert. denied, 394 
U.S. 948 (1969). . 
24. 219 Md. 485, 150 A.2d 448 (1959). 
25. See, e.g., Lowery v. State, 202 Md. 314, 96 A.2d 20 (1953) (Defendant raped 
sister-in-law to show hatred for wife; testimony of defendant's threatening 
phone calls to wife admitted at trial for the rape.). 
26. See, e.g., Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 345 A.2d 830 (1975) (in a homicide 
trial, marijuana found on defendant's person twenty days after the crime was 
erroneously admitted. The proof at trial did not show defendant to be a hit man 
or enforcer or otherwise connected with organized narcotics trafficking in such 
a way as to explain the motive for the murder.). 
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the motive exception could readily be envisioned to apply. Regardless 
of the fact patterns to which Maryland courts apply the motive 
exception, it suffers from the fundamental defect that no case 
actually defines the exception. In fact, no case relying on it specifies 
the meaning of the term "motive."27 More importantly, no opinion 
distinguishes the motive exception from other qualifications to the 
general rule of exclusion. For example, many cases confuse the 
motive exception with common scheme,28 an entirely separate 
qualification to the rule. These decisions indicate that there is a 
"connection between the different transactions as raises a fair 
inference of a common motive in each."29 If two different crimes 
actually represent different aspects of a single criminal design, they 
are parts of a common scheme directed toward a single illegal 
purpose despite the semantic accuracy of declaring that the same 
motive actuated them. 
Most commonly the cases fail to distinguish between motive and 
intent. Although such differentiation is possible,30 numerous Mary-
land cases use the terms interchangeably.3l Not surprisingly, there-
fore, a recent Maryland case referred to a trial court's jury 
instruction that used the two words synonymously as "commend-
able."32 This imprecise terminology could- conceivably engender a 
27. But see Martin v. State, 40 Md. App. 248, 389 A.2d 1374 (19781. The Martin 
court states: "[M]otive is. . . that which would appear to cause or produce the 
emotion that would in turn provoke or incite the commission of the criminal 
offense." [d. at 252 n.2, 389 A.2d at 1376 n.2 (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 486 
S.w.2d 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972». 
Martin, however, neither adopted nor implicitly approved this definition. In 
fact, the court of special appeals merely pointed out the confusion accompany-
ing the designation of particular mental states as motive. Indeed the court 
hinted that employment of the term in any context might best be avoided. [d. 
28. See, e.g., Meno v. State, 117 Md. 435, 83 A. 759 (1912) (abortionist's behavior 
indicated consistent utilization of the same ploy I. 
29. Hunter v. State, 193 Md. 596,601,69 A.2d 505, 507 (1949); Purviance v. State, 
185 Md. 189, 196,44 A.2d 474, 477 (19451. Both these cases involved gambling 
violations in which the defendants consistently used the same methods to 
commit their crimes. 
30. See, e.g., 1 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENC~; ~ 170 (Torcia ed. 19721. "Motive and 
intent are not synonymous. Motive is the inducing cause, while intent is the 
mental state with which the criminal act is committed." [d. * 170. 
31. E.g., Presley v. State, 224 Md. 550, 168 A.2d 510 (1961l, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 
957 (1962); Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 502 (1955); Jones v. State. 
182 Md. 653, 35 A.2d 916 (19441. 
32. Chandler v. State, 23 Md. App. 645. 651. 329 A.2d 430. 433 (19741. The 
instruction in relevant part stated: 
So, therefore, you are advised to consider testimony which I have 
admitted of other offenses. that is. these other times when allegedly the 
Defendant attacked his wife. with respect to the crime that the 
Defendant is on trial for in these proceedings. to the extent. and only to 
the extent. that it tends to establish a motive or an intent .... Where 
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situation in which courts unwittingly would admit evidence merely 
demonstrative of criminal propensity simply because they are unable 
to determine whether such evidence fits into any particular excep-
tion. Nevertheless, the decision of Martin v. State suggests that the 
judiciary must soon formulate a clear meaning of the motive 
exception, and that the trial courts may not admit motive evidence 
unless it is necessary for the prosecution to prove its case.33 This 
notion meshes comfortably with the current policy of balancing 
probative value against prejudicial effect/4 and with the idea that 
the intent exception applies only when intent is material to the 
case.35 
The most basic statement of the intent exception is that 
"evidence of similar offenses is admissible when relevant to establish 
intent."36 For instance, a defendant's prior batteries of a victim would 
tend to foreclose the suggestion of horseplay if the situation were to 
occur again. Similarly, a defendant's prior shopliftings could negate 
the possibly neutral or even innocent interpretation most observers 
would place on the removal of merchandise from its place of display 
to another area of a store. 
Despite the apparent simplicity of the intent exception, courts 
relying on it often confuse it with other exceptions. Aside from the 
previously noted fact that courts often equate intent with motive,37 
some authority also tends to view the intent and res gestae 
exceptions as identicaJ.38 In addition, the common scheme exception 
appears to act as a surrogate for intent on occasion,39 and some 
judicial writings indicate that intent and absence of mistake or 
accident are but opposite sides of the same coin.40 
Although the intent exception suffers from a lack of definition, it 
has been used numerous times in Maryland to admit or exclude 
intent is material, the conduct of the accused is relevant to show that 
intent. 
[d. at 650-51, 329 A.2d at 433. 
To muddy the waters further, earlier in the Chandler opinion, the court of 
special appeals stated "that the admission of this evidence barely passed muster 
as being within the 'motive' exception to the rule." [d. at 650, 329 A.2d at 433. 
33. Martin v. State, 40 Md. App. 248, 255, 389 A.2d 1374, 1377 (1978). 
34. See notes 113-25 and accompanying text infra. 
35. See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 502 (1955); Simms v. State, 39 
Md. App. 658, 388 A.2d 141 (1978). 
36. Simms v. State, 39 Md. App. 658, 670, 388 A.2d 141, 147-48 (1978). 
37. See, e.g., Presley v. State, 224 Md. 550, 168 A.2d 510 (1961), cert. denied, 368 
U.S. 957 (1962), 
38. See, e.g., Tull v. State, 230 Md. 596, 188 A.2d 150 (1963). 
39. See, e.g., Westcoat v. State, 231 Md. 364, 190 A.2d 544 (1963). 
40. E.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.s. 463 (1976); Hoes v. State, 35 Md. App. 61, 
368 A.2d 1080 (1977) !Defendant claimed mistake in shooting his paramour; 
case decided on basis of intent.). 
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evidence.41 For instance, the intent qualification almost invariably 
appears in instances involving either white collar42 or victimless43 
crimes.44 Additionally, intent frequently refers to guilty knowledge.45 
Further, the intent exception often appears in cases requiring proof 
of specific intent.46 The intent exception occasionally refutes defenses 
of mistake or accident.47 Several courts, however, have stated that 
41. E.g., Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680 (1976) (prosecutor attempted to 
use defendant's illegal transactions with informant dating back fifteen years to 
show intent to distribute narcotics); Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 502 
(1955) (defendant's prior assaults on his girlfriend used to show he intended to 
kill her); Laws v. State, 6 Md. App. 243, 251 A.2d 237 (1961) (Prior robbery and 
shooting admissible in kidnapping trial to demonstrate intent. No analysis 
beyond this.). 
42. E.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (in a prosecution of an 
attorney for false pretense accomplished by misrepresentations as to the state 
of a title to real property, evidence of similar instances of deceit involving land 
admissible to show intent); Levy v. State, 225 Md. 201, 170 A.2d 216 (in a 
forgery prosecution, testimony that the defendant had uttered other forged 
checks apparently admissible to show fraudulent intent), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 
865 (1961); Kain v. State, 222 Md. 511, 161 A.2d 454 (in a receiving stolen 
goods prosecution, testimony of two youths concerning transactions with the 
defendant in which no agreement concerning the price of stolen articles could 
be reached admissible to show guilty knowledge), cert. denied. 364 U.s. 874 
(1960); Gordon v. State, 5 Md. App. 291, 246 A.2d 623 (1968) (in a prosecution 
of attorney for embezzling client's funds from escrow, testimony of two other 
attorneys detailing defendant's admissions of other thefts from escrow admissi-
ble as demonstrative of intentl. 
43. E.g .• Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680 (1976) (in a narcotics prosecution, 
testimony of informant as to his dealings with the defendant over fifteen years 
held inadmissible under the intent exception); Meno v. State, 117 Md. 435, 83 
A. 759 (1912) (In an abortion prosecution, statement of a witness that 
defendant stated that he had performed similar operations on other girls was 
inadmissible under the intent exception.). 
44. But cf Douglas v. State, 9 Md. App. 647, 267 A.2d 291 (1970) (in a robbery 
prosecution, evidence that defendant had robbed another victim at the same 
time admissible as showing an intent to rob); Dyson v. State, 6 Md. App. 453, 
251 A.2d 606 (1969) (in a prosecution for murder and child abuse, photographs 
showing prior abuse of the victim admissible as showing intent>. 
45. E.g., Kain v. State, 222 Md. 511, 161 A.2d 454 (receiving stolen goods), cert. 
denied, 364 U.S. 874 (1960); Gordon v. State, 5 Md. App. 291, 246 A.2d 623 
(1968) (embezzlementl. In both these cases the court specifically referred to 
guilty knowledge. 
46. E.g .• Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664,350 A.2d 680 (1976) (while the prosecution was 
for possession of narcotics with intent to distribute, an informant's testimony of 
fifteen-year-old dealings with the defendant did not establish the requisite 
specific intent); Hoes v. State, 35 Md. App. 61, 368 A.2d 1080 (1977) (in a 
prosecution for assault with intent to maim, evidence adduced at the trial 
showing that the defendant had previously shot the victim admissible to 
establish the requisite specific intent>. 
47. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (evidence that defendant had 
committed similar acts of false pretense admissible to show a lack of 
inadvertence and the intent to defraud). 
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the exception only applies when intent is material to the case.4B 
Nevertheless, as recently as 1976, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
specifically criticized other courts for failing to refer to particular 
facts when applying the exception.49 
The intent exception contains another possibly confusing aspect. 
In MacEwen v. State,50 the Court of Appeals of Maryland stated: 
In the trial of a misdemeanor (and false pretenses is a 
misdemeanor) every element necessary to constitute the 
crime must be proved as a fact, and after the state, in a trial 
of a misdemeanor has made out a prima facie case of guilt of 
the crime charged, it may offer evidence, if relevant to the 
question of intent, that the [defendant] committed other acts 
of false pretense . . . .51 
From this statement it would appear that in misdemeanor trials the 
state must make out its case before it may use the intent exception. 
The defendant in Polisher v. State52 raised that contention, but the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland referred to MacEwen and noted 
that "this does not mean that the State must first establish prima 
facie every element of the crime charged, for it is the evidence of 
other offenses which may prove some of the elements of the crime 
charged."53 It thus appears that the prosecution may rely upon the 
intent exception to help construct a prima facie case. Under this 
formulation, a prosecutor could use the exception to demonstrate 
intent itself in an appropriate situation. For example, dishonest 
entrepreneurs who consistently swindle their customers could claim 
a simple misunderstanding if juries were permitted to consider only 
one fraudulent transaction at a time. 
48. See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 502 (1955) (when the defendant 
killed his girlfriend and later testified that the shooting was accidental, the 
court held that evidence of two previous assaults upon the victim by the 
defendant was admissible under the intent exception); Simms v. State, 39 Md. 
App. 658, 388 A.2d 141 (1978) (in a felony murder prosecution in which the 
state's theory was that the defendant murdered the victim during an assault 
with intent to rape, evidence that the defendant had raped another victim and 
had assaulted another with the intent to rape admissible under the intent 
exception). 
49. Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680 (1976>. The Ross case states, "[T]he 
court in each merely approved the admission into evidence of prior narcotics 
transactions under the 'intent' exception to the general rule, stating the 
proposition virtually in the abstract without any reference to the necessary 
facts." [d. at 670, 350 A.2d at 685. 
50. 194 Md. 492, 71 A.2d 464 (1950). 
51. [d. at 501-02, 71 A.2d 468. 
52. 11 Md. App. 555, 276 A.2d 102 (false pretense; defendant auto repairman 
repeatedly charged customers for work he and his subordinates never did), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971). 
53. [d. at 585, 276 A.2d at 117 (emphasis in original). 
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Additionally, the new Maryland theft statute contains what is 
tantamount to an intent exception. 54 Article 27, section 342(c) of the 
Maryland Annotated Code, which prohibits the crime formerly 
denominated receiving stolen goods, requires for a finding of guilt 
that the defendant obtain the property with either knowledge that it 
has been stolen or a belief that it probably has been stolen.55 The 
statute eases the prosecution's burden when merchants are accused. 
Under the new statute the requisite knowledge may be inferred from 
the businessman's having been found with stolen property on at least 
two prior occasions, or from his acquisition of stolen property in a 
separate transaction in the year preceeding the possession charged.56 
Consequently, this provision aids the demonstration of intent or 
perhaps absence of mistake. 
An exception to the general rule of exclusion of other crimes 
which is frequently overlooked by the courts involves the absence of 
mistake or accident. 57 Although no Maryland court relies exclusively 
upon the exception, it probably applies to the type of situation in 
which one who puts fungible property down temporarily has it stolen 
by another. An independent witness could interpret the occurrence in 
two ways: either that the second individual inadvertently picked up 
the wrong property, believing it was his; or that he simply stole it. If 
the jury were to examine these facts without any frame of reference, 
it would never find the second person guilty of theft. If, however, 
after the thief alleged mistake, the prosecution could demonstrate 
that he had done the same thing five times in the past, the 
possibilities of showing the occurrence of a criminal act and of 
obtaining a conviction greatly increase. 
Unfortunately, no Maryland decision places an exclusive re-
liance upon absence of mistake or accident when admitting evidence 
of other crimes. Instead, the courts merely include the exception 
along with several others when they attempt to apply it.58 Logic 
would seem to dictate that the exception should only apply to 
situations in which the prosecution must show the other crimes in 
order to refute a defendant's allegation of mistake or accident. 
Unless the exception is utilized in this manner prosecutors could 
unfairly and unduly prejudice a defendant by bringing up sordid 
details of his past before he even has a chance to put on his case. 
The most troublesome exception to the rule of exclusion of other 
crimes is the sex crimes exception. In its simplest form, this 
54. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, ~~ 340-345 (Supp. 1979). 
55. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, ~ 342(c) (Supp. 1979). 
56. [d. ~ 342(c)(2)(i) & (ij). 
57. E.g., Gordon v. State, 5 Md. App. 291. 246 A.2d 623 11968); Thomas v. State, 3 
Md. App. 708, 240 A.2d 646 11968). 
58. See, e.g., Gordon v. State, 5 Md. App. 291. 246 A.2d 623 11968). 
1980] Evidence of Other Crimes 255 
qualification states that evidence of prior sexual offenses with the 
same victim is admissible to demonstrate the accused's propensity 
toward and passion for illegal sexual relations with that person.59 
Indeed, several Maryland opinions go to some length to explain that 
the prosecution may show predisposition toward illicit sexual 
activities with the victim but not with anyone else.60 
Under the sex crimes exception if a divorced husband were 
charged with raping his former wife, the prosecution could conceiv-
ably buttress the case against the defendant by proving that the two 
had engaged in so-called perverted sexual activities with each other 
while they were still married. The admission of other crimes under 
such circumstances contravenes the premise underlying the exclu-
sionary rule that prosecutors may not introduce evidence of other 
crimes merely to show propensity or disposition.61 In effect the sex 
crimes exception represents an anachronistic and irrational reaction 
to "degenerate" offenders.62 Evidence of an individual's past attacks 
on the same victim constitutes appropriate fare for a judicial 
determination of what sentence to impose, not guilt or innocence. If 
this is so, it would appear that the Maryland courts should seriously 
consider eliminating the sex crimes exception. Indeed, such a step 
would seem to be mandated in the absence of any compelling 
contemporary justification for the retention of what is most probably 
an outmoded legal principle steeped in emotionalism and unneces-
sary for the protection of society. 63 
59. Wethington v. State, 3 Md. App. 237, 238 A.2d 581 (1968) (indecent exposure). 
See also Annot., 167 A.L.R. 565 (1947). 
60. E.g., Wentz v. State, 159 Md. 161, 150 A. 278 (1930); Wethington v. State, 3 Md. 
App. 237, 238 A.2d 581 (1968), 
61. Accord, Note, 46 TuL. L. REV. 336 <1971}. In assessing the sex crimes exception, 
this article states, "In short, highly inflammatory evidence of questionable 
probative value has been forced into an enumerated exception. The net effect is 
to allow the introduction of the very evidence the rule of exclusion was designed 
to prohibit - the bad character of the accused." [d. at 340. 
62. Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy, A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV. 
385 (1952). Trautman states that, "Because of the increasing belief that sexual 
psychopaths have a disposition to repeat their acts of aggression, the probative 
value of evidence of other such offenses is considered to be so high that some 
courts are beginning to question even the narrow rule of absolute exclusion." 
[d. at 406 (emphasis added). The article also lists studies which purport to 
demonstrate the recidivistic tendencies of the sex offender. [d. at 406 n.83. 
63. Some contemporary research demonstrates that society may have less to fear 
from sex offenders than from other types of criminals. Slough & Knightly, 
Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IOWA L. REV. 325, 332-34 (1956>. Furthermore, 
current medical research appears to debunk many of the myths about sex 
offenders. See Note, 46 TUL. L. REV. 336, 342 nn.44-47 (1971). 
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B. Exceptions Predicated on Factual Considerations: Identity, 
Handiwork or Signature, Common Scheme, 
and Res Gestae 
In Maryland, evidence of other crimes is admissible if it 
identifies the defendant as the perpetrator of the offense charged.64 
For example, if a defendant were to provide a victim with an account 
of his past criminal exploits, such as by warning a hold-up target 
that he had killed a resisting grocer several years before, the courts 
would admit that testimony of the earlier crime in an attempt to 
identify the accused. Although a factual situation of this nature 
would seem to occur with relative frequency, until 1975 no Maryland 
court had examined the identity exception carefully.65 In fact, a 1978 
Court of Appeals of Mary land opinion decried this dearth of prior 
analysis. 66 
Currently, the identity exception is surrounded by sufficient 
controversy to require serious judicial scrutiny. Professor McCormick 
initiated the confusion when he wrote that "identity . . . evidence 
will usually follow, as an intermediate channel, some one or more of 
the other [exceptions]."67 The Fourth Circuit construed this state-
ment to mean that "the identity exception is not really an exception 
in its own right, but rather is spoken of as a supplementary purpose 
of another exception."68 
This analysis was considered by the court of special appeals in 
Mollar v. State. 69 In that case a rapist regaled his victim with stories 
of his past criminal exploits and his talent for being arrested and 
incarcerated.70 In fact, the defendant gave the victim such a detailed 
version of his criminal history that the prosecution used it to identify 
him, a fact that eliminated the problem of the victim's earlier 
identification of someone else.71 In holding that the identity excep-
tion has an existence separate from any of its brethren, the court 
reasoned that "to hold otherwise would render the identity exception 
a purposeless existence."72 
Even though the Mollar case apparently clarified matters, the 
identity exception continued to create problems. In Cross v. State,73 
64. See, e.g., MoHar v. State, 25 Md. App. 291, 333 A.2d 625 (1975); Smithson v. 
State, 5 Md. App. 378, 247 A.2d 542 (1968). 
65. MoHar v. State, 25 Md. App. 291, 333 A.2d 625 (1975), first subjected the 
identity exception to close examination in Maryland. 
66. Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 476, 386 A.2d 757, 763 (1978). 
67. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 190 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]. 
68. United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 134 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.s. 
979 (1974), 
69. 25 Md. App. 291, 333 A.2d 625 <1975l. 
70. Id. at 295, 333 A.2d at 627. 
71. Id. at 296-97, 333 A.2d at 629. 
72. Id. at 294, 333 A.2d at 627. 
73. 282 Md. 468, 386 A.2d 757 (1978). 
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the court of appeals, without mentioning Mollar, focused on the same 
passage of McCormick quoted earlier as confusing.74 To address the 
McCormick proposition, the court resorted to yet another treatise, 
written by Underhill. This work divided the identity exception into 
ten sub-exceptions.75 The court applauded this "analysis" as "most 
useful,"76 and included all ten sub-exceptions in the body of the 
opinion.77 The court ultimately did not use this "most useful 
analysis," however, because the decision excluded the other crimes 
evidence on entirely different grounds.7s Nonetheless, in Simms v. 
State,79 a murder prosecution decided four months after Cross, the 
court of special appeals set out Underhill's ten sub-divisions of the 
identity exception and upheld the admission of other crimes on the 
basis of the sub-exception referring to ballistics evidence. so The 
problem with this approach is that it more closely resembles the 
resolution of a multiple choice examination than legal analysis. 
Furthermore, the Underhill sub-exception that pertains to modus 
operandi more accurately refers to the handiwork or signature 
exception to the rule of exclusion.sl 
74. MCCORMICK, supra" note 67, § 190. 
75. 1 H. UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 210 (Herrick ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited 
as UNDERHILL]. Underhill lists the exceptions as follows: 
[E]vidence of other offenses may be received if it shows: 
(a) the defendant's presence at the scene or in the locality of the 
crime on trial; 
(b) that the defendant was a member of an organization whose 
purpose was to commit crimes similar to the one on trial; 
(c) the defendant's identity from a handwriting exemplar, "mug 
shot," or fingerprint record from a prior arrest; 
(d) the defendant's identity from a remark made by him; 
(e) the defendant's prior theft of a gun, car or other object used in 
the offense on trial; 
(f) that the defendant was found in possession of articles taken 
from the victim of the crime on trial; 
(g) that the defendant had on another occasion used the same 
alias or the same confederate as was used by the perpetrator of the 
present crime; 
(h) that a peculiar modus operandi used by the defendant on 
another occasion was used by the perpetrator of the crime on trial; 
(i) that on another occasion the defendant was wearing the 
clothing worn by or was using certain objects used by the perpetrator of 
the crime at the time it was committed; 
(j) that the witness' view of the defendant at the other crime 
enabled him to identify the defendant as the person who committed the 
crime on trial. 
[d. § 210. Additionally, the treatise recently supplemented sub-exception (c) as 
follows: "or his identity through a ballistics "test." [d. § 210 (Herrick ed. Supp. 
1978). 
76. Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 477, 386 A.2d 757, 763 (1978). 
77. [d. at 477-78,386 A.2d at 763. 
78. [d. at 478-79,386 A.2d at 764 (evidence excluded because the proof of the other 
crimes was not clear and convincing). 
79. 39 Md. App. 658, 388 A.2d 141 (1978), 
80. [d. at 664, 388 A.2d at 145. 
81. Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 477 n.6, 386 A.2d 757, 763 n.6 (1978), 
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The handiwork or signature exception posits that evidence of 
other crimes is admissible "to prove other crimes by the accused so 
nearly identical as to earmark them as the handiwork of the 
accused."82 This exception is best illustrated by the burglar who left a 
bathroom scale by the front door of each residence he broke into so 
that he could weigh the silver he stole. The thieCs method was so 
distinctive that it became as unique as his signature. Under the 
handiwork or signature exception, if the burglar were apprehended 
later, while using the same ploy, evidence of the utilization of that 
method in anyone crime would normally be admissible in a trial for 
any other. 
While the handiwork exception appears simple in theory, it 
presents difficulties in application. The modus operandi employed by 
the defendant "must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a 
signature."83 While the techniques employed must resemble each 
other,84 they cannot be of a sort which "fit into an obvious tactical 
pattern which ... anyone disposed to commit a depredation of the 
sort for which the defendant is on trial [would useJ."85 Some 
prosecutors and lower courts fail to recognize this fact. This results 
in reversals of convictions obtained by evidence of other crimes 
which was improperly admitted under the handiwork qualification.86 
Courts also confuse the handiwork and common scheme exceptions.87 
For instance, situations arise in which an individual uses the same 
method repeatedly to perpetrate a particular type of crime. A 
physician might drug a female patient so that he could rape her.88 A 
gambler might use the same bookkeeping methodology.89 Yet, as 
82. Brafman v. State, 38 Md. App. 465, 472, 381 A.2d 687, 691 (1978) (quoting 
MCCORMICK, supra note 67, at * 190). 
83. Id. at 473, 381 A.2d at 691 (quoting MCCORMICK, supra note 67, at * 190). 
84. Compare Ellerba v. State, 41 Md. App. 712, 398 A.2d 1250 (1979) (evidence of 
separate arsons inadmissible at trial for one of them because means employed 
to set the fires differed) with Nasim v. State, 34 Md. App. 65, 366 A.2d 70 
(1976) (evidence of separate arsons admissible at trial for one of them because 
means employed to set the fires substantially similar), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
868 (1977). 
85. Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 93 m.c. Cir. 1964), quoted in United States 
v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1976); Lebedun v. State, 283 Md. 257,390 A.2d 
64 (1978); McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 375 A.2d 551 (1977). 
86. E.g., Lebedun v. State, 283 Md. 257, 390 A.2d 64 (1978); McKnight v. State, 280 
Md. 604, 375 A.2d 551 (1977). 
87. See, e.g., Cole v. State, 232 Md. 111, 194 A.2d 278 (1963) (similar modus 
operandi in cashing checks), cert. denied. 375 U.s. 980 (1964); Greenwald v. 
State, 221 Md. 245, 157 A.2d 119 (same modus operandi used by doctor issuing 
false certificates of pregnancy to facilitate circumvention of statutory age 
restrictions on marriage). appeal dismissed. 363 U.S. 721 (1960). 
88. E.g., Avery v. State, 15 Md. App. 520. 292 A.2d 728 (1972). cert. denied. 410 
U.S. 977 (19731. 
89. E.g .. Purviance v. State. 185 Md. 189. 44 A.2d 474 (1945). 
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Lebedun v. Stat~O notes, "A method of operation is oot, by itself, a 
common scheme, but merely a repetitive pattern."91 
Despite Lebedun, however, a recent court of special appeals 
decision appears to admit handiwork evidence under the banner of 
common scheme in a situation in which jail inmates who were 
attempting to escape used the same method to smuggle a handgun 
into the institution as they had earlier used to procure illegal 
narcotics.92 If the escape attempt and narcotics smuggling were 
clearly separate and unconnected crimes, logically they could not 
constitute parts of the same scheme. The fact that criminals applied 
the same ingenious stratagem to different kinds of crimes merely 
indicated the adaptability of the ploy, not the existence of an 
ultimate criminal purpose. Admission of such a modus operandi 
under the common scheme exception only confuses the issue. 
Maryland courts permit evidence of other crimes to be intro-
duced when it demonstrates a common scheme.93 Maryland courts 
have frequently relied on this qualification to guide their rulings as 
to various questions of admissibility.94 Generally the exception arises 
in situations in which criminals commit several crimes to accomplish 
a single illegal purpose. For instance, the situation in which an 
armed robber steals a car ahead of time to facilitate his escape from 
the bank he robs illustrates a common scheme. 
Two recent Maryland cases, State v. Jones95 and Cross v. State,96 
explain the common scheme exception in detail. As noted in Jones, 
"[M]ere proximity in time and location within which several offenses 
may be committed does not necessarily make one offense intertwine 
with the others. Immediateness and site are not determinative. . . . 
Nor does the fact that the offenses were committed by the same 
persons qualify them .... "97 Rather, as stated in Cross, "there must 
be not merely a similarity in the results, but such a concurrence of 
90. 283 Md. 257, 390 A.2d 64 (1978). 
91. Id. at 280, 390 A.2d at 75, <quoting Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 386 A.2d 757 
(1978»). 
92. Whitfield v. State, 42 Md. App. 107, 400 A.2d 772 (1979), rev'd on other 
grounds, 287 Md. 124, 411 A.2d 415 (1980), 
93. See, e.g., Mason v. State, 12 Md. App. 655, 280 A.2d 753 (1971), 
94. E.g., Callahan v. State, 174 Md. 47,197 A. 589 (1938); Isaacs v. State, 31 Md. 
App. 604, 358 A.2d 273 (1976); Avery v. State, 15 Md. App. 520, 292 A.2d 728 
(1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 977 (1973); Douglas v. State, 9 Md. App. 647, 267 
A.2d 291 (1970). 
95. 284 Md. 232, 395 A.2d 1182 (1979). 
96. 282 Md. 468, 386 A.2d 757 (1978). 
97. State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232,243,395 A.2d 1182, 1188 (1979). In explaining the 
common scheme exception earlier, the Jones court stated: 
[T]o establish the existence of a common scheme or plan, it is necessary 
to prove that the various acts constituting the offenses naturally relate 
to one another by time, location, circumstances and parties so as to give 
rise to the conclusion that they are several stages of a continuing 
transaction. 
Id. at 243, 395 A.2d at 1188. 
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common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained 
as caused by a general plan of which they are the individual 
manifestations."98 In short, superficial concurrence or mere coinci-
dence do not demonstrate a common scheme. 
In addition to the confusion of common scheme and motive noted 
earlier,99 courts often use the common scheme exception to admit 
evidence that demonstrates the totality of circumstances surround-
ing the defendant's actions. If a thief pilfers a number of checks and 
forges them at different locations to obtain money,IOO he is not 
implementing a plan which has as its ultimate purpose one 
fraudulent enrichment at the end. Nor are the thiefs actions so 
unique as to qualify for handiwork or signature treatment.l0l Yet the 
jury might only be able to comprehend the case against the thief if it 
has an overview of all his actions. Here the res gestae exception, as 
opposed to the common scheme exception, should apply. 
The general proposition regarding the res gestae exception was 
set forth in Wilson v. State. 102 "Evidence of declarations and acts 
which are an immediate accompaniment of the act charged and so 
closely connected with the main fact as to constitute a part of it, and 
without which the main fact might not be properly understood, are 
admissible as part of the res gestae."103 Essentially, courts will admit 
the evidence of the other crimes if it helps the jury to understand the 
whole picture with regard to the defendant's activities. Unlike the 
court in Wilson, Maryland courts often apply this exception without 
specifically mentioning the term "res gestae." This practice has 
arisen in a variety of circumstances, including illegal abortion,I04 
perverted practices,105 pandering,106 and the illegal sale of alcoholic 
beverages. 107 None of these cases, however, discussed why the jury 
needed to know the whole story to determine guilt of a specific crime. 
98. Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 475, 386 A.2d 757, 762 (1978) (quoting 2 J. 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE * 410 (3d ed. 1940». 
99. See text accompanying notes 28 & 29. 
100. E.g., Ward v. State, 219 Md. 559, 150 A.2d 257 (1959); Thomas v. State, 3 Md. 
App. 708, 240 A.2d 646 (1968). 
101. For an analysis of the handiwork or signature exception, see the text 
accompanying notes 82-92 supra. 
102. 181 Md. 1, 26 A.2d 770 (1942). 
103. [d. at 3, 26 A.2d at 772. See also Tull v. State, 230 Md. 596, 188 A.2d 150 (1963) 
(defendant shot father-in-law and wife in family dispute). 
104. Avery v. State, 121 Md. 229, 88 A. 148 (1913) (illegal abortions on several 
different girls). 
105. Blake v. State, 210 Md. 459, 124 A.2d 273 (1956) (act of sodomy contempor-
aneous with other perverted practices). 
106. Mazer v. State, 231 Md. 40, 188 A.2d 552 (1963) (prostitute turned state's 
witness in pandering case also testified about illegal "sitting" activities). 
107. Mitchell v. State, 178 Md. 579, 16 A.2d 161 (1940) (essentially contemporaneous 
illegal liquor sales). 
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While a judge might require information regarding the total context 
of the defendant's crimes in order to impose an appropriate sentence, 
providing a jury with this information might well unduly prejudice 
the defendant. loB 
III. CONSIDERATIONS OF FAIRNESS 
TO THE DEFENDANT 
A. Standard of Proof 
Even if evidence of the other crimes that the defendant is 
accused of committing falls within one or more of the exceptions 
discussed above, the prosecution cannot automatically introduce it. 
As a threshhold matter, the state must first prove that the accused in 
fact committed the other crimes. The difficulty rests in the burden of 
proof with respect to those crimes. The traditional criminal standard 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, however, creates unnecessary 
difficulty for the prosecutor whose case preparation focuses on the 
crime at bar. On the other hand, a standard of proof based on the 
usual civil standard of mere preponderance could readily create 
convictions supported by character assassination. To resolve this 
dilemma, Maryland courts require that before the prosecution may 
introduce any evidence of other crimes, it must first prove the 
defendant's involvement in those crimes by clear and convincing 
evidence,l09 a standard of proof falling between a reasonable doubt 
108. With the decision in State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232, 395 A.2d 1182 (1979), one 
might well question the viability of the res gestae exception. In Jones, the court 
of appeals held inadmissible evidence of essentially contemporaneous robberies 
committed by the defendant in a trial for a murder committed in the course of 
still another robbery. Note, however, that Jones did not mention res gestae and 
that each of the robberies involved an independent decision. 
109. State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232, 395 A.2d 1182 (1979); Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 
386 A.2d 757 (1978); Whitfield v. State, 42 Md. App. 107,400 A.2d 772 (1979), 
rev'd on other grounds, 287 Md. 124, 411 A.2d 415 (1980). 
The latest case concerning this issue, Offutt v. State, 44 Md. App. 670, 410 
A.2d 611 (1980), contains the following statement: "We do not read Cross as 
requiring that evidence of the other crime must be clear and convincing. The 
only requirement is that the defendant's involvement be clear and convincing." 
Id. at 675, 410 at 614. The court of special appeals drew this somewhat obscure 
distinction because of the unusual facts of the case. In Offutt, a bungling hold-up 
man handed employees of two separate businesses a note stating, "Give me call 
your money." Id. at 671-73, 410 A.2d at 612-13. Because of the note's 
incomprehensibility, neither of the employees took the defendant seriously at 
first. Consequently, when the state introduced evidence of the second incident at 
the defendant's trial for the first incident, the defendant objected on the ground 
that the state had not proven the second crime by clear and convincing 
evidence. Id. at 675, 410 A.2d at 614. In dismissing this contention, the court of 
special appeals held that the state need only demonstrate the defendant's 
involvement in the other crime by clear and convincing evidence, not the 
occurrence of the other crime itself. Of course, had the defendant told the 
employees to give him "all," rather than "call," their money this dilemma would 
never have surfaced. 
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and mere preponderance. The state may satisfy this requirement by 
either circumstantial or direct evidence. 110 
In light of Maryland's use of the clear and convincing standard, 
acquittal of a prior offense does not necessarily preclude its 
introduction at a later trial. The result of the original trial could 
indicate nothing more than a technical failure of proof. Maryland 
recognizes this situation and allows the introduction of other crimes 
evidence despite an acquittal. 111 To insure fairness, however, the 
defendant may prove any acquittal, and failure to allow him to do so 
constitutes a denial of due process. 112 
B. Balancing Probative Value Against Prejudicial Effect 
As mentioned above,113 Maryland courts now employ a two-step 
process in determining whether to admit evidence of other crimes. 
Generally, judges have no difficulty in pigeonholing evidence of other 
crimes into one or several of the exceptions.1I4 Yet there is a problem 
with such categorization in that it has an enormous potential for 
creating undue prejudice to the defendant. liS Recognizing this factor, 
the more recent Maryland decisions require that before any informa-
tion as to an accused's other crimes is admitted into evidence, it must 
be subjected to rigid scrutiny.1I6 The prejudicial effect of evidence of 
other crimes committed by a defendant must be weighed against its 
probative value.117 This process has led to the utilization of a 
balancing test which has been synthesized by Professor McCormick 
as follows: liS 
[S]ome of the wiser opinions (especially recent ones) recog-
nize that the problem is not merely one of pigeonholing, but 
one of balancing, on the one side, the actual need for the 
other crimes evidence in light of the issues and the other 
evidence available to the prosecution, the convincingness of 
the evidence that the other crimes were committed and that 
110. Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 386 A.2d 757 (1978). 
111. Womble v. State, 8 Md. App. 119, 258 A.2d 786 (1969) (failure to allow post 
conviction petitioner to prove acquittal amounted to denial of fair trial and due 
process). 
112. Id. at 126, 258 A.2d at 789. 
113. See text accompanying notes 19 & 20 supra. 
114. See Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 474, 386 A.2d 757, 761 <1978>. 
115. United States v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1976>. But see Womble v. State, 8 
Md. App. 119, 258 A.2d 786 <1969>. 
116. E.g., Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680 (1976); Berger v. State, 179 Md. 
410,20 A.2d 146 (1941); Gorski v. State, 1 Md. App. 200. 228 A.2d 835 (1967). 
117. E.g., Worthen v. State, 42 Md. App. 20, 399 A.2d 272 (1979) (not only was the 
evidence excessively prejudicial. it also alluded to a sexual crime. which never 
occurred. against an infantl. 
118. MCCORMICK, supra note 67. * 190. 
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the accused was the actor, and the strength or weakness of 
the other crimes evidence in supporting the issue, and on the 
other, the degree to which the jury wlIf probably be roused 
by the evidence to overmastering hostility. 119 
263 
Additionally, if the prosecution does not need a particular kind 
of evidence to prove an element of its case, such as motive, the courts 
automatically exclude the evidence as too prejudicial. 120 Although 
Maryland courts have noted that certain cases have a greater 
requirement for other crimes evidence because of the surreptitious 
nature of the crime charged,121 the recent decision by the court of 
appeals in Worthen v. State122 effectively abolishes the proposition 
that special categories of crimes should automatically receive more 
lenient treatment.123 
Generally cases that focus on the impact of evidence of other 
. crimes involve jury trials. Indeed, the McCormick multi-faceted 
balancing test focuses on jury contamination.124 Implicit in such a 
formulation is the idea that a judge who sits as a trier of fact at a 
court trial is not prejudicially influenced by erroneously admitted 
evidence. Yet it strains logic to assert that a judge who commits a 
good faith error in admitting evidence will not be influenced by it. In 
fact there is some Maryland case authority that suggests that judges 
too may be impermissibly influenced by evidence they erroneously 
admit. 125 
119. [d. § 190, quoted in Hoes v. State, 35 Md. App. 61, 368 A.2d 1080 (1977); Mollar 
v. State, 25 Md. App. 291, 333 A.2d 625 (1975). Despite its inherent 
awkwardness, "convincingness" is actually a word. 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTION· 
ARY 548 (Compact ed. 1971). 
120. Martin v. State, 40 Md. App. 248, 389 A.2d 1374 <1978>-
121. E.g., Nasim v. State, 34 Md. App. 65, 366 A.2d 70 (1976) (arson), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 868 (1977). One can also logically make the same assertion about most 
cases of first degree murder, burglary, and a host of other crimes. 
122. 42 Md. App. 20, 399 A.2d 272 <1979>-
123. [d. at 38, 399 A.2d at 283. 
124. MCCORMICK, supra note 67, § 190. The Cross case underscores this, stating: 
The preferred method for submitting any evidence of other crimes to the 
court during trial would be by way of a proffer to the trial judge outside 
the presence or hearing of the jury. Such a proffer not only protects the 
jury from immediate prejudice, but also allows the trial judge to 
determine whether there is any way to limit the prejudicial aspects of 
evidence while retaining its probative character and whether the 
evidence should be properly introduced at that time. 
Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 478 n.7, 386 A.2d 757, 764 n.7 (19781. 
125. See Dobbs v. State, 148 Md. 34, 129 A. 275 (1925) (Offutt, J., concurring) (three 
judge trial panel erroneously admitted other crimes evidence I. See also United 
States v. Hamrick, 293 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1961>. The Hamrick case relates the 
following situation: "[Tlhe court requested and, over objection, received 
Hamrick's past criminal record and read therefrom. The court observed: 'You 
can tell more what kind of a snake you are dealing with if you can see his 
color.''' [d. at 469. On a more whimsical note, H.L. Mencken once wrote: 
Our rules of evidence, like our system of punishments, are full of 
irrationalities. They exclude a great many pertinent facts, for example, 
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C. Temporal Remoteness 
A defendant's past criminal history, at some point in time, 
becomes too remote to have any legitimate bearing on a current 
case. 126 Even though the running of the statute of limitations as to 
the other crimes offered as proof does not bar their admission,127 it 
would appear that under some circumstances, the courts should hold 
such evidence inadmissible as a matter of law. It is well settled in 
Maryland, however, that remoteness affects the weight rather than 
the admissibility of the evidence.128 Notwithstanding this general 
principle, recent Maryland case law indicates that judicial thinking 
in this regard is changing. In 1976, the court of special appeals noted 
that a time lapse of six years renders proof of other crimes so remote 
as to be almost devoid of evidentiary value.129 A year later, the court 
of special appeals implied that at some point the evidence will be so 
remote as to be inadmissible. 130 In short, remoteness now has two 
what sort of man is accused of the crime, and what sort suffered from it. 
The jury is supposed to hear and know nothing about the record of the 
accused, which is not mentioned until he has been found guilty and the 
judge is ready to sentence him. In Maryland, where persons charged 
with crime, including even capital crime, may elect to be tried by a 
judge or judges without a jury, this leads to frequent absurdities. The 
judge usually knows quite well what the accused's record is, but he is 
supposed to be ignorant of it until he has announced his verdict. 
I long ago suggested that, in trials for murder or assault, it should 
be competent for the defense· to introduce testimony showing the 
character of the victim. Certainly it is absurd to inflict the same 
punishment for killing or mauling a perfectly decent and innocent 
person, and doing the same to a gunman or other professional ruffian. I 
am willing to go further. That is, I am willing to admit evidence to show 
that the victim, though perhaps not a criminal himself, was of such 
small social value that his death or injury was no appreciable public 
loss. But in this field the lawyers and judges cling to the idea of equality 
before the law, though it has been cheerfully abandoned elsewhere, for 
example, in the field of labor relations. 
H. MENCKEN. MINORITY REPORT 5-6 (1956). 
126. See generally Annot., 88 A.L.R.3d 8 (1978); Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 1359 (1961); 
Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 841 (1961); Annot., 64 AL.R.2d 823 (1959); Annot., 42 
AL.R.2d 854 (1955); Annot., 40 AL.R.2d 817 (1955); Annot., 34 AL.R.2d 777 
(954); Annot., 167 A.L.R. 565 (947); Annot., 80 AL.R. 1306 (1932); Annot., 63 
AL.R. 602 (1929). 
127. Duncan v. State, 282 Md. 385, 384 A.2d 456 (1978) (dictum). 
128. Purviance v. State, 185 Md. 189,44 A2d 474 (975) <evidence of the same type 
of criminal activity a year earlier not barred on account of remoteness). 
129. Gooch v. State, 34 Md. App. 331, 367 A.2d 90 (1976). 
130. Hoes v. State, 35 Md. App. 61, 368 A2d 1080 (1977). Hoes states that, "[Tlhe 
nature of the prior crime and the crime charged and the logical interrelation-
ship of such crimes are the controlling factors in determining whether a 
particular lapse of time is sufficiently substantial to make the prior crime too 
remote." [d. at 70, 368 A.2d at 1086 <quoting 1 F. WHARTON, supra note 30, at 
260). In a related area, note that the federal courts ordinarily impose a ten-year 
time limit on convictions used to impeach a witness. FED. R. EVID. 609(b). 
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separate but interrelated aspects. Defense counsel can first argue 
inadmissibility as a matter of law. If that argument fails, the 
advocate can later attempt to persuade the trier of fact that it should 
not give such stale evidence much significance in determining guilt. 
D. Severance 
When a defendant is charged with more than one crime, the 
state frequently attempts to join several of the alleged offenses at one 
trial. If the trial of several charges at once would unduly prejudice 
the defendant, for example by thwarting a strategic decision to 
testify about one crime but not another, the court may order 
severance of the various counts. 131 
Often courts are called upon to resolve disputes involving 
severance and the admissibility of evidence of other crimes together. 
This circumstance is so prevalent that in 1977 the court of appeals 
held: "A defendant charged with similar but unrelated offenses is 
entitled to a severance where he establishes that the evidence as to 
each individual offense would not be mutually admissible at separate 
trials."132 Accordingly, while a prosecutor may try an individual for 
several different offenses at once, if the state, at a trial for one crime, 
could not admit evidence as to another it seeks to try at the same 
time, the trial judge must sever the charges. In other words, if an 
exception to the general rule of exclusion does not apply, or if it 
applies but its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value, 
severance of the charges must result. 
Maryland courts often use the same rationales in deciding 
questions pertaining to severance and to admissibility of evidence of 
other crimes. Judges excluding evidence of other crimes generally 
are seeking to avoid confusing or prejudicing jurors, or confronting a 
defendant with charges against which he is unprepared to defend. 133 
Similarly, the joinder of similar offenses is disallowed because it may 
embarrass or confound the defendant in presenting separate de-
fenses; it may lead to such a cumulation of evidence as to create an 
inference of guilt; it may increase latent hostility to the defendant; or 
it may lead the jury to infer a criminal disposition on the part of the 
131. Md. Rule 745(c). Additionally, note that Md. Rule 712, which refers to joinder of 
offenses and defendants in the charging document, appears to sanction joinder 
only when the offenses are of the same or similar character, part of the res 
gestae, or part of a common scheme. Id. This latter rule, however, only governs 
pleading and not the method by which the offenses are brought to trial. To 
illustrate, the joinder for trial of crimes alleged in several separate charging 
documents would not run afoul of Rule 712. It might, however, be improper 
under Rule 745(c) and the judicial construction thereof. 
132. McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 612, 375 A.2d 551, 556 (1977>. The same 
quotation also appears in State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232, 239, 395 A.2d 1182, 1186 
(1979), and Ellerba v. State, 41 Md. App. 712, 729, 398 A.2d 1250, 1259 (1979), 
133. E.g., Brafman v. State, 38 Md. App. 465, 381 A.2d 687 (1978) (rape). 
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defendant. '34 Actually then, because both severance and other crimes 
issues share the same basic concern for fairness to the defendant, 
they represent but slightly different facets of the same issue. 
IV. A BETTER ALTERNATIVE 
As Maryland case law amply demonstrates, current handling of 
other crimes issues hardly represents a prototype for fledging legal 
analysts. The rule as to other crimes evidence appears in one 
exclusionary principle with eight separate identifiable exceptions. 
One of these exceptions, identity, is further divided into ten 
sub-exceptions. '35 Additionally, courts determining that an exception 
applies must thereafter resort to a complicated balancing test to 
decide whether to admit evidence of other crimes. '36 Given this 
degree of complexity and outright confusion, any attorney or judge 
must necessarily encounter difficulty. In fact, numerous legal 
treatises and writings bluntly, and at times even vehemently, 
criticize the unwarranted complication accompanying the other 
crimes dilemma. '37 
The rule of exclusion and its exceptions had their genesis in a 
turn-of-century New York decision, People v.' Molineaux. '38 In that 
case, the Court of Appeals of New York attempted to implement a 
policy against convictions predicated solely on a defendant's bad 
character, the basic concept now recognized in Maryland. '39 To 
accomplish this purpose, the New York court formulated a rule of 
exclusion of evidence of other crimes which it stated was not an 
absolute principle. '40 Consistent with this approach, the opinion then 
noted exceptions to the rule but observed that "the exceptions to the 
rule cannot be stated with categorical precision."'41 Nevertheless, the 
court then attempted to do just that, and furthermore implicitly 
recognized its formulation as exhaustive, saying, "Let us now 
134. State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232, 395 A.2d 1182 (1979) (homicide); McKnight v. 
State, 280 Md. 604, 375 A.2d 551 (1977) (robbery), 
135. See note 75 supra. 
136. See text accompanying notes 115 & 116 supra. 
137. E.g., Annot., 88 A.L.R.3d 8 (1978); Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 854 (1955); Annot.. 40 
A.L.R.2d 817 (1955); Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1013 11951>; Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 1080 
(1951>. 
138. 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 11901>. Professor Stone attributes the first express 
formulation of the "MIMIC" exception to Molineaux. Stone. The Exclusion of 
Similar Fact Evidence: America. 51 HARV, L. RE\,. 988 (1938). 
139. See, e.g., Dobson v. State, 24 Md. App. 644, 335 A.2d 124 (1975); Gilchrist v. 
State, 2 Md. App. 635, 236 A.2d 299 (1967); Gorski v. State. 1 Md. App. 200. 
228 A.2d 835 11967>. 
140. People v. Molineaux, 168 N.Y. 264, 292. 61 N.E. 286. 294 (1901). 
141. Id. at 293, 61 N.E. at 294. 
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endeavor to apply to the case at bar each of these exceptions to the 
general rule."142 After the court determined that the proffered 
evidence fit into none of the categories it had devised, it reversed a 
conviction for murder by poisoning. 143 
The rule of exclusion formulated in Molineaux ultimately 
received richly deserved criticism. The most eloquent came from 
Professor Stone who derisively labeled the Molineaux exclusionary 
principle as the "spurious rule."144 In fact, in his initial criticism of 
Molineaux/45 Stone noted that while British courts unconsciously 
utilized and applied a rule of exclusion for a time, with the advent of 
the Makin case,146 the English now adhere to what he termed the 
original or inclusionary rule which he stated as follows: "Evidence 
which is relevant merely as showing that a person has a propensity 
to do acts of a certain kind is not admissible to prove that he did any 
such acts."147 
Current British Commonwealth cases, using essentially the 
same inclusionary rule as formulated by Stone, have set forth the 
criterion that unless the evidence of other crimes demonstrates 
propensity and nothing else, it is admissible. 148 Such a rule repre-
sents a better alternative to the confusion the exclusionary rule has 
spawned because it directly focuses on the policy the courts seek to 
implement. It seeks the avoidance of convictions bottomed solely on 
propensity.149 Furthermore, those few American jurisdictions using 
142. [d. at 294, 61 N.E. at 294. 
143. [d. at 335, 61 N.E. at 310. 
144. Stone, The Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988, 
1005 (1938l. 
145. Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 HARV. L. 
REV. 954 (1933). 
146. Makin v. Attorney-General for New South Wales [1894] A.C. 57. Makin states: 
In their Lordships' opinion the principles which must govern the 
decision of the case are clear, though the application of them is by no 
means free from difficulty. It is undoubtedly not competent for the 
prosecution to adduce evidence tending to shew that the accused has 
been guilty of criminal acts other than those covered by the indictment, 
for the purpose of leading to the conclusion that the accused is a person 
likely from his criminal conduct or character to have committed the 
offence for which he is being tried. On the other hand, the mere fact 
that the evidence adduced tends to shew the commission of other crimes 
does not render it inadmissible if it be relevant to an issue before the 
jury, and it may be so relevant ifit bears upon the question whether the 
acts alleged to constitute the crime charged in the indictment were 
designed or accidental, or to rebut a defence which would otherwise be 
open to the accused. The statement of these general principles is easy, 
but it is obvious that it may often be very difficult to draw the line and 
to decide whether a particular piece of evidence is on the one side or the 
other. 
[d. at 65. 
147. Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 HARV. L. 
REV. 954, 976 (1933), 
148. See, e.g., Regina v. Lawson, [1971] 4 W.W.R. 350 (citing cases). 
149. See the text accompanying note 139 supra. 
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an inclusionary rule at one time or another experienced no apparent 
difficulty applying that rule. ISO At the very least this approach would 
eradicate the cumbersome exclusionary rule and its eight ill-defined 
exceptions. 
The inclusionary rule would avoid other disadvantages of the 
exclusionary rule as well. First, the exclusionary rule causes judges' 
concern to focus on precisely what constitutes a particular exception 
as opposed to whether the evidence offered only goes to propensity. 151 
Second, the exclusionary rule may exclude evidence not solely 
demonstrative of a defendant's bad character because it fails to fall 
within an exception to the exclusionary rule; or it may admit proof of 
bad character simply because prosecutorial ingenuity in presentation 
causes it to fall within an exception. 152 The inclusionary rule does not 
risk these dysfunctional results, however, because its primary 
emphasis mirrors its purpose, the avoidance of convictions based 
solely on bad character. 
Maryland can ill afford any of these deleterious by-products of 
the exclusionary rule. In fact the state's jurisprudence already 
150. E.g., People v. Woods, 35 Cal. 2d 504, 218 P.2d 981 (1950); Day v. 
Commonwealth, 196 Va. 907, 86 S.E.2d 23 (1955). In the Woods case, the court 
stated: 
It is settled in this state that except when it shows merely criminal 
disposition, evidence which tends logically and by reasonable inference 
to establish any fact material for the prosecution, or to overcome any 
material fact sought to be proved by the defense, is admissible although 
it may connect the accused with an offense not included in the charge. 
35 Cal. 2d at 509,218 P.2d at 984. Since Woods, California has codified this rule 
in the following language: 
(a) [E]vidence of a person's character or a trait of his character ... is 
inadmissible to prove his conduct on a specified occasion. 
(b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that the 
person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to 
prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident) other than his 
disposition to commit such acts. 
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 (West 1966). 
The Day case states: 
The accepted rule to be derived from the cases is that evidence which 
shows or tends to show the accused guilty of the commission of other 
offenses at other times is inadmissible if its only relevancy is to show 
the character of the accused or his disposition to commit an offense 
similar to that charged; but if such evidence tends to prove any other 
relevant fact of the offense charged, and is otherwise admissible, it will 
not be excluded merely because it also shows him to have been guilty of 
another crime. 
196 Va. at 914, 86 S.E.2d at 26-27. For some reason, however, Virginia has 
now adopted the cumbersome exclusionary approach. See, e.g., King v. 
Commonwealth, 217 Va. 912, 234 S.E.2d 67 (1977); Jordan v. Commonwealth, 
216 Va. 768, 222 S.E.2d 573 (1976). 
151. Stone, The Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988, 
1005-06 (1938), 
152. Comment, The Admissibility of Other Crimes in Texas, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 
1410 (1972), 
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contains precedential authority for the admission of other crimes 
evidence that does not strictly fall within one of the exceptions to the 
rule of exclusion in a case involving rebuttal testimony.ls3 
Furthermore, a 1973 Fourth Circuit case from the District of 
Maryland, United States v. Woods/54 embraced the inclusionary 
approach to the other crimes issue. In that case, a defendant charged 
with the murder by suffocation of her infant foster son objected to the 
introduction of evidence demonstrating that beginning in 1945 the 
defendant had custody of or access to nine children who suffered at 
least twenty cyanotic episodes with seven deaths resulting. 155 While 
the evidence did not fit squarely into any of the exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule, the Fourth Circuit upheld admission of the 
evidence because it was not introduced solely to demonstrate 
criminal propensity.ls6 Additionally, the court stated the following 
proposition of law: 
[E]vidence of other offenses may be received, if relevant, for 
any purpose other than to show a mere propensity or 
disposition on the part of the defendant to commit the crime, 
provided that the trial judge may exclude the evidence if its 
probative value is outweighed by the risk that its admission 
will create a substantial danger of undue prejudice to the 
accused:157 
In essence, then, while the Woods court refused to be bound by 
the strictures of the exclusionary rule's arbitrary categories, it still 
achieved the purpose of avoiding a conviction solely based on 
propensity. There is no reason whatsoever why Maryland could not 
adopt this approach. Aside from the many commentaries favoring 
it,IS8 the wording of the inclusionary rule promotes an analysis of 
153. Setzer v. State, 29 Md. App. 347, 348 A.2d 866 (1975). The purported rebuttal 
evidence in Setzer was excluded because it did not serve to rebut defendant's 
testimony. Rather, it showed only propensity. 
154. 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979 (1974l. 
155. [d. at 130. 
156. [d. at 134. See also Note, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1074 <1974l. 
157. United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 134 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 
979 (1974l. 
Unfortunately, despite the clarity of the proposition in Woods, a recent 
Fourth Circuit case, United States v. Johnson, 610 F.2d 194 (4th Cir. 1979), 
frames the rule pertaining to evidence of other crimes in exclusionary terms. 
This formulation, however, was only dictum, as the court disposed of the case 
on the issue of whether a purported error at the trial was prejudicial. [d. at 196. 
The Johnson case did not mention Woods. 
158. E.g., Comment, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other 
Matters, 70 YALE L. REV. 763 (1961); Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy, A 
Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV. 385 (1952); Stone, The Exclusion of Similar 
Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REV. 988 (1938); Comment, The 
Admissibility of Other Crimes in Texas, 50 TEX. L. REV. 1409 (1972); Gregg, 
Other Acts of Sexual Misbehavior and Perversion as Evidence in Prosecutions for 
Sexual Offenses, 6 ARIZ. L. REV. 212 (1965); Note, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1074 <1974>. 
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other crimes issues that is predicated upon the policy the law seeks 
to implement. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although current Maryland law generates more confusion than 
clarity in the area of other crimes evidence, the situation is hardly 
without a remedy. The courts have an alternative, the inclusionary 
rule. This new rule could supplant with little difficulty the 
exclusionary rule and its exceptions which are now used by the 
Maryland courts. Additionally, under an inclusionary formulation, 
judges would still have the pertinent considerations of fairness to the 
defendant as useful guidelines for an analysis more immediately 
concerned with criminal propensity. In this manner, the courts could 
finally implement, rather than subvert, the policy behind the current 
rules pertaining to the admissibility of other crimes evidence. 
Michael Patrick May 
